Hazard Insurance – Definition

Cite this article as:"Hazard Insurance – Definition," in The Business Professor, updated November 29, 2018, last accessed October 20, 2020, https://thebusinessprofessor.com/lesson/hazard-insurance-explained/.


Hazard Insurance Definition

Hazard Insurance insures against losses associated with damages to property due to natural phenomena such as fire, flooding, severe storms, earthquakes and the like. Based on policy, the property owner will receive compensation in the event of damages to covered properties by natural disasters. Generally, the property owner is required to pay insurance premiums –  mostly bi-annually or annually depending on the terms of the policy.

A Little More on What is Hazard Insurance

Generally, the owner’s policy does not cover all natural events which might result in damage to property. However, a number of contingency plans are put in place to ensure damage is catered for or might be placed into separate insurance policies. High risk locations, such as Florida, require that its home or property owners apply for an additional insurance policy to cover any damages not listed in the general insurance policies.

References for Hazard Insurance

Academic Research on Hazard Insurance

  • Charity hazard—A real hazard to natural disaster insurance?, Raschky, P. A., & Weck-Hannemann, H. (2007). Environmental Hazards, 7 (4), 321-329. This paper gives an economic analysis of the institutional arrangements on the market for natural disaster insurances focusing on imperfections caused by governmental financial relief. It explains why charity hazard is a thron in the flesh for natural disaster insurances.
  • Beyond moral hazard : Insurance as moral opportunity , Beyond moral hazard: Insurance as moral opportunity, Stone, D. A. (1999). Conn. Ins. LJ, 6, 11. This article looks into the morality of natural disaster insurances and the risks of exploitation.
  • Moral hazard , i nsurance , and some collusion , Alger, I., & Ma, C. T. A. (2003).  Journal of economic behavior & organization, 50 (2), 225-247. This paper analyzes two cases that exposes the risks of dishonesty in insurance and collusion.
  • Natural hazard insurance in Europe: tailored responses to climate change are needed , Schwarze, R., Schwindt, M., Weck-Hannemann, H., Raschky, P., Zahn, F., & Wagner, G. G. (2011). Environmental Policy and Governance, 21 (1), 14-30. This article provides basic insight into the existing systems of natural hazards insurance in Europe, their structural characteristics and peculiarities. It further expounds on the difficulties these systems face in the light of ever increasing natural disasters. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.
  • Moral hazard , i nsurance and public loss prevention, Moral hazard, insurance and public loss prevention, Lee, K. (1992). Journal of Risk and Insurance, 275-283.
  • Community attitudes to natural h azard insurance, what are the salient facts?, Britton, N. R. (1989). In Seminar on Natural Hazard and Reinsurance. Sterling Reisurance.
  • Moral hazard and insurance contracts, winter, R. A. (1992). In Contributions to Insurance Economics (pp. 61-96). Springer, Dordrecht. This essay analyzes and extends the theory of optimal insurance under moral hazard, with a focus on the form of insurance contracts. It reviews as well moral hazard with a partially informed insurer and dynamic models of moral hazard and ends on enquiries into the theory of moral hazard and insurance.
  • Moral hazard and competitive insurance markets, Arnott, R. J. (1992). In Contributions to insurance economics (pp. 325-358). Springer, Dordrecht. This thesis looks into the theory of moral hazard in the context of insurance and investigates the properties of the schedule relating the net insurance payout to the accident damage in a partial equilibrium context. It reviews certain results from a long-term research project undertaken by Joseph Stiglitz.
  • Moral hazard , i nsurance claims, and repeated insurance contracts, Robinson,C., & Zheng, B. (2010). Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d’économique , 43 (3), 967-993. This paper posits a simple model of repeated automobile insurance contracts, providing a framework for analyzing changes in aggregate insurance data in periods of changes that affect driver incentives.
  • How does natural hazard insurance literature discuss the risks of climate change? , Starominski-Uehara, M., & Keskitalo, E. C. H. (2016)… Journal of Insurance Regulation, 35 (6). Natural hazard insurance has been increasingly considered in the literature of climate change, premised on that, this paper reviews how peer-reviewed literature on natural hazard insurance discusses the risks of climate change. The study highlights the increasing role of natural hazard insurance as a business opportunity for some.
  • Moral hazard , i nsurance, and some collusion, Brundin, I., & Ma, C. T. A. (1998). This paper gives further insight into moral hazard, insurance and collusion from the perspective of a risk-averse consumer.
  • Some Real Property H azard Insurance Problems for Texas Mortgagors and Mortgagees , Lisk, D. (1987). Hous. L. Rev., 24, 717.

Was this article helpful?