Bank Wire – Definition

Cite this article as:"Bank Wire – Definition," in The Business Professor, updated September 10, 2019, last accessed September 21, 2020, https://thebusinessprofessor.com/lesson/bank-wire-definition/.

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Bank Wire Definition

A bank wire refers to a direct and electronic transfer of messages, account information and notifications from one bank account to another. It is also described as an electronic system used by major banks to communicate messages and information about the accounts of clients. A bank wire was developed to foster electronic communications between banks which will help in facilitating swift transactions from one account to another. The wire is simply a computerized system that enable banks send and exchange messages, transaction requests, account information and notifications.

A Little More on What is a Bank Wire Transfer

Bank wire has no effect on the transfer or money from one bank account to another bank account which is described as wire transfer. Receiving banks are notified of actual transfer payments or wire transfer through a bank wire. Hence, bank wire ensures that banks are not left in the dark as regards the transactions that are made into accounts such as fund deposit and transfer.

It is necessary to state that there is a clear distinction between a bank wire and a wire transfer. While a bank wire is an electronic communication systems that major banks use to transmit information, messages and information about accounts, a wire transfer is an electronic transfer of funds from one account to another. When a wire transfer is done, abks communicate amongst themselves as to who the recipients are, the amount transferred and the account receiving the transfer through a bank wire. The International bank account numbers (IBAN numbers) help to sort out and identify the correct ban where the recipient in a wire transfer belongs.

Bank Wire and Security

With the development of bank wires and an increase in wire transfers, cybersecurity threats have also multiplied. Banks face cyber attacks during wire transfers and other cyber threats such as bank wires being hacked. There are three common cyber attacks associated with bank wires and wire transfers, they are;

  • Direct-access attacks: these attacks come in the form of bugs, viruses and affect the general system.
  • Backdoor attacks: individuals use this method to access systems that do not have authentication methods.
  • Denial-of-service attacks: this attack entails entering incorrect passwords multiple times in a way that the original owner of the account is prevented from using the account which will be blocked after multiple entry.

Major banks are investing heavily in the prevention of cyber attacks. Despite these available measures, individual businesses and large businesses including government systems are constant targets of cyber attacks.

Reference for “Bank Wire”

https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bankwire.asp

https://www.thebalance.com › Personal Finance › Banking and Loans › Basics

https://www.thebalance.com/bank-wire-transfer-basics-315444

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wire_transfer

https://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Bank+wire

Academics research on “Bank Wire”

An adaptive, non-uniform cache structure for wire-delay dominated on-chip caches, Kim, C., Burger, D., & Keckler, S. W. (2002, October). An adaptive, non-uniform cache structure for wire-delay dominated on-chip caches. In Acm Sigplan Notices (Vol. 37, No. 10, pp. 211-222). ACM. Growing wire delays will force substantive changes in the designs of large caches. Traditional cache architectures assume that each level in the cache hierarchy has a single, uniform access time. Increases in on-chip communication delays will make the hit time of large on-chip caches a function of a line’s physical location within the cache. Consequently, cache access times will become a continuum of latencies rather than a single discrete latency. This non-uniformity can be exploited to provide faster access to cache lines in the portions of the cache that reside closer to the processor. In this paper, we evaluate a series of cache designs that provides fast hits to multi-megabyte cache memories. We first propose physical designs for these Non-Uniform Cache Architectures (NUCAs). We extend these physical designs with logical policies that allow important data to migrate toward the processor within the same level of the cache. We show that, for multi-megabyte level-two caches, an adaptive, dynamic NUCA design achieves 1.5 times the IPC of a Uniform Cache Architecture of any size, outperforms the best static NUCA scheme by 11%, outperforms the best three-level hierarchy–while using less silicon area–by 13%, and comes within 13% of an ideal minimal hit latency solution.

Scalable and interactive visual analysis of financial wire transactions for fraud detection, Chang, R., Lee, A., Ghoniem, M., Kosara, R., Ribarsky, W., Yang, J., … & Sudjianto, A. (2008). Scalable and interactive visual analysis of financial wire transactions for fraud detection. Information visualization7(1), 63-76. Large financial institutions such as Bank of America handle hundreds of thousands of wire transactions per day. Although most transactions are legitimate, these institutions have legal and financial obligations to discover those that are suspicious. With the methods of fraudulent activities ever changing, searching on predefined patterns is often insufficient in detecting previously undiscovered methods. In this paper, we present a set of coordinated visualizations based on identifying specific keywords within the wire transactions. The different views used in our system depict relationships among keywords and accounts over time. Furthermore, we introduce a search-by-example technique, which extracts accounts that show similar transaction patterns. Our system can be connected to a database to handle millions of transactions and still preserve high interactivity. In collaboration with the Anti-Money Laundering division at Bank of America, we demonstrate that using our tool, investigators are able to detect accounts and transactions that exhibit suspicious behaviors.

Allocating the risk of loss for bank card fraud on the Internet, Gainer, R. (1996). Allocating the risk of loss for bank card fraud on the Internet. J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L.15, 39.

International Commercial Wire Transfers: The Lack of Standards, Tallackson, J. S., & Vallejo, N. (1986). International Commercial Wire Transfers: The Lack of Standards. NCJ Int’l L. & Com. Reg.11, 639.

The Bank-Customer Relationship in an Electronic Credit Transfer System, Clarke, J. J. (1971). The Bank-Customer Relationship in an Electronic Credit Transfer System. Rutgers J. Computers & L.2, 1.

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