FICO score Payday loans andcreditcards: New liquidity andcreditscoring puzzles?, Agarwal, S., Skiba, P. M., & Tobacman, J. (2009). Payday loans and credit cards: New liquidity and credit scoring puzzles?.American Economic Review,99(2), 412-17. The creditcrunch of 2007: What went wrong? Why? What lessons can be learned?, Hull, J. C. (2009). The credit crunch of 2007: What went wrong? Why? What lessons can be learned?. InThe First Credit Market Turmoil Of The 21st Century: Implications for Public Policy(pp. 161-174). This paper explains the products that were used to securitize mortgages during the period leading up to the credit crunch of 2007 and explains why many of these products have performed so badly. It also examines some of the lessons that can be learned from the crisis. Scorecards as devices for consumercredit:thecase of Fair, Isaac & Company Incorporated, Poon, M. (2007). Scorecards as devices for consumer credit: the case of Fair, Isaac & Company Incorporated.The sociological review,55, 284-306. This paper focuses on the scorecard a calculative tool for collecting and managing customers of credits. A shift in the mortgage landscape: The 1990s move to automatedcreditevaluations, Straka, J. W. (2000). A shift in the mortgage landscape: The 1990s move to automated credit evaluations.Journal of Housing research, 207-232. This article reviews the shift in the 1990s from traditional manual mortgage underwriting to mortgage scoring models and statistical automated underwriting (AU). It concludes that AU has become the predominant mortgage underwriting method. Still, further significant changes are likely. Examining statistical AU's history, growth, and underlying factors and concerns, The article goes on to considers the question of how far AU should be relied upon to evaluate more marginal and higher-risk mortgage applicants by analysing its history, growth, and underlying factors. From new deal institutions to capital markets: Commercial consumer riskscoresand the making of subprime mortgage finance, Poon, M. (2009). From new deal institutions to capital markets: Commercial consumer risk scores and the making of subprime mortgage finance.Accounting, Organizations and Society,34(5), 654-674. This paper discusses the investment fueled US mortgage market has which is being sustainned by New Deal institutions called government sponsored enterprises (GSEs). This research traces the movement of a specific brand of commercial consumer credit analytics into mortgage underwriting. The paper aims to show that once modified by specific GSE interpretations the calculative properties generated by these credit bureau scores reconfigured mortgage finance into two parts: the conventional, risk-adverse, GSE conforming prime and an infrastructurally distinct, risk-avaricious, investment grade subprime. Credit scoringand loanscoringas tools for improved management of federalcreditprograms, Stanton, T. H. (1999). Credit scoring and loan scoring as tools for improved management of federal credit programs.Financier,6(2/3), 24. This report examines the development and application of credit scoring and loan scoring by private lenders and the relevance of those developments to federal credit programs. Therole of ratings inthesubprime mortgage crisis:Theart of corporate andthescience of consumercreditrating, Rona-Tas, A., & Hiss, S. (2010). The role of ratings in the subprime mortgage crisis: The art of corporate and the science of consumer credit rating. InMarkets on Trial: The Economic Sociology of the US Financial Crisis: Part A(pp. 115-155). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. This paper analyses the roles played by both consumer and corporate credit ratings agencies in the US subprime mortgage crisis. It examines the formalized scoring system deployed by Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion for assessing individuals. The authors discuss the five problems responsible for the rating failures, and compare the way consumer and corporate rating agencies tackled these difficulties. TheTermination of Subprime Hybrid and FixedRate Mortgages, PenningtonCross, A., & Ho, G. (2010). The Termination of Subprime Hybrid and FixedRate Mortgages.Real Estate Economics,38(3), 399-426. This paper analyses the impact of adjustablerate and hybrid loans on subprime mortgage lending in the mortgage market. It also examines their role in the mixture of events that helped to trigger the 2007/2008 subprime mortgage crisis. Risky borrowers or risky mortgages disaggregating effects using propensityscoremodels, Ding, L., Quercia, R., Li, W., & Ratcliffe, J. (2011). Risky borrowers or risky mortgages disaggregating effects using propensity score models.Journal of Real Estate Research,33(2), 245-277. In this research, the authors examine the relative risk of subprime mortgages and a sample of community reinvestment loans originated through the Community Advantage Program (CAP). Using the propensity score matching method, they constructed a sample of comparable borrowers with similar risk characteristics but holding the two different loan products. Results show that the sample of community reinvestment loans have a lower default risk than subprime loans. The paper suggests that similar borrowers holding more sustainable products exhibit significantly lower default risks. Payment changes and default risk:Theimpact of refinancing on expectedcreditlosses, Tracy, J. S., & Wright, J. (2012). Payment changes and default risk: The impact of refinancing on expected credit losses. This paper analyzes the relationship between changes in borrowers' monthly mortgage payments and future credit performance. The authors make use of a competing risk model to estimate the sensitivity of default risk to downward adjustments of borrowers' monthly mortgage payments for a large sample of prime adjustable-rate mortgages. Stability in consumercredit scores: Level and direction ofFICO scoredrift as a precursor to mortgage default and prepayment, , Smith, B. C. (2011). Stability in consumer credit scores: Level and direction of FICO score drift as a precursor to mortgage default and prepayment.Journal of Housing Economics,20(4), 285-298. This article represents an extension of the expansive credit risk and credit migration literature, prominent in the corporate bond and securities risk pricing literature, to an analysis of the drift of consumer credit scores. A rich data set of residential mortgages is used to observe credit score migration post loan origination. The results indicate credit scores provide signals and information to investors and servicing agents in a fashion similar to credit ratings on commercial paper as to default potential.