Academic Research on Market Economy How Russia became amarket economy, slund, A. (1995). Creating amarket economyin Eastern Europe: The case of Poland, Lipton, D., Sachs, J., Fischer, S., & Kornai, J. (1990). Brookings papers on economic activity,1990(1), 75-147. Theory of themarket economy, Stackelberg, H. V. (1952). Business groups in amarket economy, Goto, A. (1982European economic review,19(1), 53-70. The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature and significance of the interfirm relationship called the business group. First, the nature of the Japanese business group is discussed Finally, the relationship between the input-output relationship of the firms and their group affiliation is tested. Theory of the firm; resource allocation in amarket economy, Cohen, K. J., & Cyert, R. M. (1965).(No. INVES-ET E10 C678). Prentice-Hall. The transition to amarket economy: Pitfalls of partial reform, Murphy, K. M., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1992). The Quarterly Journal of Economics,107(3), 889-906. This study presents a theory of a partial economic reform of a planned economy, similar to the one that took place in Russia since 1988 and in China earlier. The paper shows how this reform can result in a substantial diversion of subsidized inputs away from state firms and toward private firms even when state firms value these inputs more. The result may be a reduction of total output. The model also explains why partial reform failed in Russia but worked in China. The virtues of gradualism and legitimacy in the transition to amarket economy, Dewatripont, M., & Roland, G. (1992).The Economic Journal,102(411), 291-300. This paper presents a simplified model of sectoral restructuring in Eastern Europe. It focuses on the impact of political constraints (unanimity and/or majority worker approval) on reform proposals when the government faces a heterogeneous workforce, holding private information on relative outside opportunities. Locational determinants of foreign direct investment in an emergingmarket economy: evidence from Tukey, Erdal, F., & Tatoglu, E. (2002). Multinational business review,10, 21-27. Over the past two decades, Turkey has recorded a substantial increase in the level of annual foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Building on the prior literature, this paper provides an empirical analysis of location-related determinants of FDI. This paper aims to show that while Turkey offers several location advantages to foreign investors in terms of market size, infrastructure, openness of the economy and market attractiveness, the lack of exchange rate and economic stability has hindered its efforts to harbor much higher volume of FDI. China: Transition to amarket economy, Chai, J. C. (1998). OUP Catalogue. This book is a comprehensive account of Chinas systemic reforms, as well as of their transferability to other economies in transition. This book provides a careful examination of the structural elements of China's new economic system, a detailed analysis of changes in the functional elements of the system, and an assessment of the open-door policy China's foreign trade and foreign investment regimes. The asymmetry of European integration, or why the EU cannot be a 'socialmarket economy', Scharpf, F. W. (2010).Socio-economic review,8(2), 211-250. This paper explains the impact of integration by law in the European Union on member states of the EU. Political clientelism, democracy, andmarket economy, Roniger, L. (2004). Political clientelism, democracy, and market economy. This paper presents a proper definition of clientelism contrary to that of past literatures. The paper starts by providing insights on the initial definition of clientelism in the 1960s, and then provides details on itrs conceptual shifts and trends. Agricultural credit problems and policies during the transition to amarket economyin Central and Eastern Europe, Swinnen, J. F., & Gow, H. R. (1999). Food policy,24(1), 21-47. This paper assesses the problems of financing Central and Eastern European agriculture during the present transitionary period and the role of government in this process. The paper looks at why credit markets work imperfectly, even in well developed market economies, focusing on problems related to asymmetric information, adverse selection, moral hazard, credit rationing, optimal debt instrument choice and initial wealth. Finally, the paper discusses how financial market innovations have solved some of the credit market problems and derives the implications for government policies.