Market for Corporate Control
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Market for Corporate Control Mergers and themarket for corporate control, Manne, H. G. (1965). Mergers and the market for corporate control.Journal of Political economy,73(2), 110-120. The basic proposition advanced in this paper is that the control of corporations may constitute a valuable asset, that this asset exists independent of any interest in either economies of scale or monopoly profits, that an active market for corporate control exists, and that a great many mergers are probably the result of the successful workings of this special market. The paper constitutes an introduction to a study of the market for corporation control. Themarket for corporate control: The scientific evidence, Jensen, M. C., & Ruback, R. S. (1983). The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence.Journal of Financial economics,11(1-4), 5-50. This paper reviews much of the scientific literature on the market for corporate control. The paper also argues that the market for corporate control is best viewed as an arena in which managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources. Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and themarket for corporate control, Stulz, R. (1988). Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control.Journal of financial Economics,20, 25-54. This paper analyzes how managerial control of voting rights affects firm value and financing policies. The paper aims to show that an increase in the fraction of voting rights controlled by management decreases the probability of a successful tender offer and increases the premium offered if a tender offer is made. One share-one vote and themarket for corporate control, Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1988). One share-one vote and the market for corporate control.Journal of financial economics,20, 175-202. This paper analyzes the optimality of the one share-one vote rule. It focus on takeover bids as a mechanism for allocating control. The paper assumes two types of control benefits benefits to security holders and private benefits to the controlling party. The paper also includes a discussion of the empirical evidence resulting from the study of these control benefits. Themarket for corporate control: The empirical evidence since 1980, Jarrell, G. A., Brickley, J. A., & Netter, J. M. (1988). The market for corporate control: The empirical evidence since 1980.Journal of Economic perspectives,2(1), 49-68. In the 1980s, the market for corporate control has been increasingly active, and the quantity of output of academic researchers studying corporate control questions has mirrored the market activity. This review examines the returns to bidders and targets, and the effects of defending against hostile takeovers. Themarket for corporate controland firm innovation, Hitt, M. A., Hoskisson, R. E., Johnson, R. A., & Moesel, D. D. (1996). The market for corporate control and firm innovation.Academy of management journal,39(5), 1084-1119. This research examines an integrated theoretical model that explains how strategies for participating in the market for corporate control (acquisitions and divestitures) affect internal control mechanisms and, together, influence internal and external innovation. In this paper, ten hypotheses were proposed, out of which nine received support. The paper aims to show that engaging in the market for corporate control strongly affects the context in which innovation is framed, the control mechanisms employed, and the design and process of innovation. Shareholder investment horizons and themarket for corporate control, Gaspar, J. M., Massa, M., & Matos, P. (2005). Shareholder investment horizons and the market for corporate control.Journal of financial economics,76(1), 135-165. This paper investigates how the investment horizon of a firm's institutional shareholders impacts the market for corporate control. Uisng findings from investigations, the paper aims to show that firms held by short-term investors have a weaker bargaining position in acquisitions. Interfirm tender offers and themarket for corporate control, Bradley, M. (1980). Interfirm tender offers and the market for corporate control.Journal of business, 345-376. This paper examines the nature of interfirm cash tender offers. I this paper, a model based on this interpretation, efficient and competitive markets, and rational expectations is developed and tested. Organization theory and themarket for corporate control: A dynamic analysis of the characteristics of large takeover targets, 1980-1990, Davis, G. F., & Stout, S. K. (1992). Organization theory and the market for corporate control: A dynamic analysis of the characteristics of large takeover targets, 1980-1990.Administrative Science Quarterly, 605-633. This paper describes how takeovers are accomplished and why they are not readily accommodated by existing organizational theories. The paper shows that greater organizational slack, age, and having a finance chief executive officer increased the risk of takeover; family control and financial characteristics such as a higher market-to-book ratio lowered the risk; while bank control and intercorporate network ties had no discernable effect. 1 The fundamental agency problem and its mitigation: independence, equity, and themarket for corporate control, Dalton, D. R., Hitt, M. A., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, C. M. (2007). 1 The fundamental agency problem and its mitigation: independence, equity, and the market for corporate control.The academy of management annals,1(1), 1-64. This study provides a review of the fundamental agency problem and its mitigation through independence, equity, and the market for corporate control. FDI as an Outcome of theMarket for Corporate Control: Theory and Evidence, Head, K., & Ries, J. (2008). FDI as an Outcome of the Market for Corporate Control: Theory and Evidence.Journal of International Economics,74(1), 2-20. This study proposes a model of foreign direct investments (FDI) in which headquarters bid to control overseas assets. The paper presents an equation for bilateral FDI stocks that resembles the recently developed fixed effects approach to modelling bilateral trade flows. The internationalmarket for corporate control: Mergers and acquisitions of US firms by Japanese firms, Kang, J. K. (1993). The international market for corporate control: Mergers and acquisitions of US firms by Japanese firms.Journal of Financial Economics,34(3), 345-371. This paper shows the importance of bidder-specific characteristics and exchange-rate movements in explaining the cross-sectional variation in bidder returns. The paper uses Japanese mergers and acquisitions in the United States as case study.