Management Entrenchment - Definition
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Academic Research Management Entrenchment Management entrenchment: The case of manager-specific investments, Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1989). Management entrenchment: The case of manager-specific investments.Journal of financial economics,25(1), 123-139. This study describes how managers can entrench themselves by making manager-specific investments that make it costly for shareholders to replace them. In the paper, a model of entrenchment has empirical implications that are consistent with the evidence on managerial behavior is generated for better analysis. Antitakeover provisions in bonds: bondholder protection ormanagement entrenchment, Kahan, M., & Klausner, M. (1992). Antitakeover provisions in bonds: bondholder protection or management entrenchment.UCLA L. Rev.,40, 931. Managerial ownership and accounting conservatism in Japan: A test ofmanagement entrenchmenteffect, Shuto, A., & Takada, T. (2010). Managerial ownership and accounting conservatism in Japan: A test of management entrenchment effect.Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,37(78), 815-840. This paper examines the effect of managerial ownership on the demand for accounting conservatism in Japan. The main aim of this paper is to show that accounting conservatism contributes to addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders. The role of outside shareholders, outside boards, andmanagement entrenchmentin CEO selection, Park, S., & Rozeff, M. S. (1986). The role of outside shareholders, outside boards, and management entrenchment in CEO selection. This study advances the notion that large outside shareholders, outside boards, and management entrenchment influence the choice of inside or outside CEOs. To back this claim, the paper utilizes a sample of 385 CEO changes from 1979 to 1986. The study aims to show that large outside shareholders play an active role in controlling manager-shareholder conflicts. Strong boards,management entrenchment, and accounting restatement, Baber, W. R., Kang, S., & Liang, L. (2005). Strong boards, management entrenchment, and accounting restatement. InSSRN. com/abstract(Vol. 760324). Using a large sample of widely-held U.S. firms, this paper investigatse cross-sectional associations between the probability of financial restatements and contractual and legal provisions that restrict shareholder rights, while controlling for other key governance characteristics representing the strength of the Board of Directors, equity incentives of the CEO, and share ownership structure. Management entrenchmentand the cost of equity capital, Collins, D., & Huang, H. (2011). Management entrenchment and the cost of equity capital.Journal of Business Research,64(4), 356-362. This paper investigates the effect of management entrenchment on the cost of equity capital. Employee ownership: A theoretical and empirical investigation ofmanagement entrenchmentvs. reward management, Aubert, N., Garnotel, G., Lapied, A., & Rousseau, P. (2014). Employee ownership: A theoretical and empirical investigation of management entrenchment vs. reward management.Economic Modelling,40, 423-434. This literature suggests that good managers use employee ownership as a reward management tool, whereas bad managers implement it for entrenchment, thus suggesting the existence of an equilibrium level of employee ownership. The contributions of this paper are both theoretical and empirical. Theoretically, this paper fills a gap in the published research by taking into account both positive and negative outcomes of employee ownership. The study further investigates how employee ownership affects management tenure. Management entrenchmentand the valuation discount of dual class firms, Baulkaran, V. (2014). Management entrenchment and the valuation discount of dual class firms.The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,54(1), 70-81. This study examines the link between managerial entrenchment and the dual class discount. R&D Investment, Governance andManagement Entrenchmentin French Companies Listed in SBF250., Dhaoui, A., & Jouini, F. (2011). R&D Investment, Governance and Management Entrenchment in French Companies Listed in SBF250.Journal of Economic & Social Studies (JECOSS),1(2). This study seeks to explain the management entrenchment by investment of free cash flow (FCF) in research and development (R&D), debt, market structure (internal or external), the multinational nature of firms and the characteristics of the board of directors using a sample of 128 groups of French companies listed on the SBF250 between 2003 and 2008. An Empirical Analysis ofManagement EntrenchmentEffect on the Over-investment of Listed CompaniesEvidence from Listed Manufacturing Companies [J], Hailong, Z., & Bingxiang, L. (2010). An Empirical Analysis of Management Entrenchment Effect on the Over-investment of Listed CompaniesEvidence from Listed Manufacturing Companies [J].Management Review,7, 017. Employee Ownership:Management Entrenchmentvs. Reward Management, Aubert, N., Lapied, A., & Rousseau, P. (2011). Employee Ownership: Management Entrenchment vs. Reward Management. This paper develops a model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. It identifies the motives behind employees ownerships on the part of good and bad managers respectively.