Most Favored Nation – Explained

Most Favored Nation (MFN) Definition Optimal tariffs and the choice of technology Discriminatory tariffs vs. the ‘Most Favored Nation‘clause, Choi, J. P. (1995). Optimal tariffs and the choice of technology Discriminatory tariffs vs. the Most Favored Nationclause.Journal of International Economics,38(1-2), 143-160. This paper compares the effects of optimal tariffs on the technology choice of exporters under the discriminatory tariffs regime and the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause. The paper aims to highlight the role of MFN as a commitment mechanism to resolve a time-inconsistency problem facing the importing country. Economic and legal aspects of theMost–Favored–Nationclause, Horn, H., & Mavroidis, P. C. (2001). Economic and legal aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation clause.European Journal of Political Economy,17(2), 233-279. This paper explores the Most-Favored Nation clause (MFN) which forbids Members of a trade agreement to discriminate between trading partners. It examines the widespread belief among policy makers that there are strong economic rationales for the MFN provision. The purpose of the paper is to survey economic theory that may shed light on whether this view is well founded or not, and to summarise salient features of the case law as it concerns MFN. What do” facilitating practices” facilitate? An empirical investigation ofmost–favored–nationclauses in natural gas contracts, Crocker, K. J., & Lyon, T. P. (1994). What do” facilitating practices” facilitate? An empirical investigation of most-favored-nation clauses in natural gas contracts.The Journal of Law and Economics,37(2), 297-322. This paper shows that the pattern of MFN adoption, in conjunction with the structure of the nondiscrimination regions and the parallels with other nonstrategic price escalation provisions, lends strong support to the efficiency rationale. Tariffs and theMost–Favored–NationClause, Caplin, A., & Krishna, K. (1988). Tariffs and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause. International trade bargaining and themostfavorednationclause, Ludema, R. D. (1991). International trade bargaining and the mostfavorednation clause.Economics & Politics,3(1), 1-20. This paper advances a model of multilateral trade negotiations to analyze the effects of the mostfavorednation clause (MFN) on international trade agreements.The paper aims to suggest that many of the criticisms levied against the MFN clause are misplaced; moreover, attempts to replace unconditional MFN with conditional MFN may sacrifice many of the longheld values of the GATT. State Trading and theMost–Favored–NationClause, Domke, M., & Hazard, J. N. (1958). State Trading and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause.American Journal of International Law,52(1), 55-68. Most Favored Nation: A Framework for Smart Economic Policy, Mintz, J. (2001). Most Favored Nation: A Framework for Smart Economic Policy.forestry,10, 0. Tariffs and themost favored nationclause, Saggi, K. (2004). Tariffs and the most favored nation clause.Journal of international economics,63(2), 341-368. In anncountry oligopoly model of intraindustry trade (n3), this paper explores the economics of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. The paper shows that high cost countries refusereciprocalMFN adoption with other countries and also lose even ifothersengage in reciprocal MFN adoption amongst themselves. The GATT codes and the unconditionalmost–favored–nationprinciple, Hufbauer, G. C., Erb, J. S., & Starr, H. P. (1980). The GATT codes and the unconditional most-favored-nation principle.Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus.,12, 59. Themost–favored–nationpricing policy and negotiated prices, Cooper, T. E., & Fries, T. L. (1991). The most-favored-nation pricing policy and negotiated prices.International Journal of Industrial Organization,9(2), 209-223. Previous work has viewed the most-favored-nation (MFN) contract as a practice capable of facilitating collusion among sellers, but this paper shows that even a monopoly seller may gain by including the MFN provision in sales contracts. The paper considers a case in which the seller negotiates price separately with each of two buyers. Most–favored–nationclauses and clustered negotiations, Pahre, R. (2001). Most-favored-nation clauses and clustered negotiations.International Organization,55(4), 859-890. This paper highlights the unbalanced theorectical attention between centralized negotiations and problems of centralized monitoring and enforcement. This paper addresses this gap by examining variation in a particular form of centralized negotiations termed “clustering. The paper goes on to explain the concept of clustering and the conditions in which it can be applied. Mulitilateralizing investment treaties throughmost–favored–nationclauses, Schill, S. W. (2009). Mulitilateralizing investment treaties through most-favored-nation clauses.Berkeley J. Int’l Law,27, 496.