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Money Market Deposit Account: The price-concentration relationship in banking, Berger, A. N., & Hannan, T. H. (1989). The Review of Economics and Statistics, 291-299. The commonly observed positive correlation between market concentration and profitability may be explained by non-competitive pricing behavior, as argued by the structure-performance hypothesis, or by the greater efficiency of firms with dominant market shares, as argued by the efficient structure hypothesis. By examining the price-concentration relationship instead of the profit-concentration relationship, this paper tests the structure-performance hypothesis in a manner that excludes the efficient-structure hypothesis as an alternative explanation of the results. The effect of consumer switching costs on prices: A theory and its application to the bankdeposit market, Sharpe, S. A. (1997). Review of Industrial Organization,12(1), 79-94. As demonstrated by Klemperer (1987), if households face a cost of switching among brands of a differentiated good, pricing is likely to be more competitive, the greater is the fraction of customers that move into or around the market. The author generalize this theory to a world with arbitrary market structure and test it empirically using panel data on bank retail deposit interest rates. The paper finds that the amount of household migration in a market has a significant competitive influence on price markups, that is, a positive effect on the level of deposit interest rates. The concentration/conduct relationship in bankdeposit markets, Calem, P. S., & Carlino, G. A. (1991). The Review of Economics and Statistics, 268-276. This study investigates the structure/conduct/performance relationship in retail deposit markets. The study explicitly incorporates conduct as the link between structure and performance in local deposit markets. It attempts to determine whether banks typically behave competitively or strategically, and whether their conduct is influenced by market concentration. Moneyand the stockmarket, Friedman, M. (1988).Journal of Political Economy,96(2), 221-245. Marketstructure and the nature of price rigidity: evidence from themarketfor consumer deposits, Neumark, D., & Sharpe, S. A. (1992).The Quarterly Journal of Economics,107(2), 657-680. This paper examines the asymmetric impacts of market concentration on the dynamic adjustment of prices to shocks on banks using panel data of customers. The paper aims to show that banks in concentrated markets are slower to raise interest rates on deposits in response to rising market interest rates, but are faster to reduce them in response to declining market interest rates. Markets for Money–Does the Garn-St. GermainMoney Market Deposit AccountOvercompete with Mutual Funds, Turner, B. R. (1983). Markets for Money–Does the Garn-St. Germain Money Market Deposit Account Overcompete with Mutual Funds.Vand. L. Rev.,36, 1129. Marketdefinition and the analysis of antitrust in banking, Kwast, M. L., Starr-McCluer, M., & Wolken, J. D. (1997). The Antitrust Bulletin,42(4), 973-995. This paper reexamines the question of market definition in banking, using two micro data sets uniquely well-suited to the task. It finds that local depositories remain the dominant supplier of key financial services to households and small businesses, with geographic proximity still important in their institution choice. Marketshare inequality, the number of competitors, and the HHI: An examination of bank pricing, Hannan, T. H. (1997). Review of Industrial Organization,12(1), 23-35. This paper seeks to determine whether the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) adequately accounts for the roles of market share inequality and the number of competitors in explaining bank deposit and loan rates. Banks’ responses to deregulation: Profits, technology, and efficiency, Humphrey, D. B., & Pulley, L. B. (1997).Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 73-93. This paper explores banks response to deregulation, and how it affected their monetary policies. It investigates how banks were forced to raise their deposit fees, reduce operation costs, and shift to higher earning assets during the 1980s. The behavior ofmoneydemand in the 1980s, Hetzel, R. L., & Mehra, Y. P. (1989).Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,21(4), 455-463. Depositinsurance, bank regulation, and financial system risks, Pennacchi, G. (2006).Journal of Monetary Economics,53(1), 1-30. This paper considers an an alternative government insurance system that mitigates distortions to risk-taking yet preserves liquidity hedging and information synergies in modern day banks. The study presents a model is presented to show that if insurance premiums are set to be actuarially fair, incentives for banks to take excessive systematic risks remain.